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Bilad Micr kheirha li gheirha
The Land of Egypt, its riches belong to others
Ancient Egyptian proverb
Aside from Egypt being the "cradle of civilization," its
main attraction to foreign governments of early times was its
prominent geographical location. It provided a major land-
bridge between Europe, Asia and Africa. With this in mind,
Napoleon Bonaparte landed 40,000 troops at Alexandria in 1798 in
expectation of obtaining a base astride the eastern lifeline of
the British Empire. Moscow also recognized Egypt's
geostrategic location. In 1833 the then Russian Foreign
Minister Giers declared that:
The proclaimed principle of Egypt for the Egyptians is a
Utopia. Egypt, because of its geographical location at
the junction of three continents, holds a position of
such political importance that its independence is
impossible.
1
The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 increased the country's
geographical significance all the more. On the average, four
ship transits per day were made through that waterway one year
after opening, and by 1966 this figure had risen to 60.
Although closed since the Arab-Israeli war in June 1967, when
"Serquis Yakobson, "Russia and Africa," in
Ivo J. Lederer, ed. , Russian Forei gn Policy : Essays in
Hi storical Perspective (New Haven, 1 9 b 2 ) , p. 457~i

reopened in June 1975 it will again receive a heavy flow of
ship traffic. The oil carrying supertankers constitute only
some six percent of the world marine and at its present depth
2the Canal can accommodate most of the world s dry cargo ships.
Egypt's strategic significance to major powers in the
first half of the 20th century was primarily derived from the
Canal, but in mid century new events forced a change of focus.
The creation of an Israeli State in 1948 and the
Soviet Union's arms deal with Egypt in 1955 brought new issues
to the forefront which propelled Cairo to greater visibility
and prominence in world affairs. Pure geographical
importance declined, although location remained especially
significant to the Soviet Navy- -more on this in Section IV.
With Israel came the Arab-Israeli conflict, in which among
Arab states Egypt maintained a dominating role. Because the
United States and the USSR took opposing sides in that
struggle, it assumed the character of something more than a
regional skirmish; it had, and still has, the potential to
erupt into a catastrophic war. Along with Russian weapons
came the Kremlin's desire for influence in, and ultimately
2The Egyptian government is now implementing a program
that will rejuvenate the Canal Zone. Port Said and Suez city
will be rebuilt and made tax-free ports. The Canal will be
widened and deepened in two stages. The first, taking three
years during which traffic will not be interrupted, will make
the waterway navigable for ships of 150,000 tons. The second
stage will enable ships up to 200,000 tons to pass through.
See "What Clearing the Canal Means," Economist
,
February 2, 1974, p. 37; and "Arab Pride and Power," Newsweek ,
February 1.8, 1974, p. 45.

3some control of, Egyptian affairs. The Western powers were
concerned because Moscow made no secret of the fact that it not
only wanted them excluded from Egypt, but it wanted them out of
the entire Middle East region.
These two principal reasons for Egypt's international
importance— the Arab-Israeli conflict and Soviet aims--have
ancillary ramifications which cannot be ignored. First, oil
must enter the picture because it is now tied to the Arab-
Israeli conflict through its use as a political coercive force.
Egypt is a member of the Organization of Arab Petroleum
Exporting Countries (OAPEC) and this gives Cairo a voice in the
3group s policy planning. Second, because of a high degree of
interaction between Middle East states, Soviet actions toward
Egypt and Cairo's responses necessarily have some finite impact
on other countries in the area. Hence, Moscow's policies
toward Egypt encompass more area and more peoples than just
Egypt and its inhabitants.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the policies
that Kremlin leaders pursued in their relations with Egypt
during a 20 year period, 1955 to 1975. I consider how Moscow
managed to penetrate Egypt, thus the Middle East; what
mechanisms the Soviets used to project their presence into the
region; and the returns they desired from involvement. A
recurrent theme of the paper is that Marxist-Leninist theory
3
The other members ore Abu Dhabi, Algeria, Bahrain,
Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and Syria.

4not only consistently laged major policy decisions made with
respect to the Near East, but that Soviet ideology was often-
times relegated to secondary importance when brought face to
face with the Kremlin's Realpolitikcrs . In addition, it
should be kept in mind that the Soviets have used policies
proven successful in Egypt in their relations with other Arab
countries; therefore, I suggest that a study of Soviet policy
in Egypt gives one an insight to Soviet policy toward other
"progressive" Arab states. Lastly, while this paper is a
historical study, it is not meant to be simply a record of past
events. It is meant to enable one to have an understanding of
present events, and, to a certain extent, to provide one with
some feel for the course that Soviet policy in Egypt might take
in the near future.

II. A FOOTHOLD GAINED
Those who adhere to the "school of continuity" between
Imperial Russia's and the Soviet Union's expansion policy have
little trouble rationalizing the Soviet thrust into Egypt in
1955. After all, the USSR was only a new name for old Russia
and in the historic subconscious of the Russian people there is
deeply imbedded a concern with the Muslim Middle East. Islam
became established in Central and Eastern Asia at various times
after the Arab conquests of the 7th and 8th centuries. It was
widespread in what are now the Azerbaijan, Uzbek, Tadzhik and
Turkman SSRs by the end of the 9th century. Most of the Muslim
khanates were conquered and annexed by Russia in the
16 century; the remaining Muslim peoples were incorporated into
the Russian empire during the 18th and 19th centuries.
Presently, some 30 million persons who can historically be
regarded as Muslims, and whose culture is broadly speaking
Islamic, live in the Soviet Union.
Historical inertia for expansion to the south gathered
momentum with the Tsar's desire for warm water ports and their
conquests into the contiguous states of Turkey and Persia.
The "Eastern Question" revolved around the fate of
Constantinople, the Turkish Straits and the disposition of the
^George Schopflin, ed
.
, The Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe (New York, 1970), p. 478.

6Balkan territories of the crumbling Ottoman Empire. In the
early 1780s Catherine the Great extended military assistance to
rebellious Egyptians, exploiting an opportunity to threaten
Constantinople and the Straits from the rear. By 1786, the
Mamluks , a powerful "Guards" formation in Egypt, were a
quarter Russian and the Russian Consul was defending the
autonomous Mamluk Beys of Egypt against Turkish protests,
stating that they were under the protection of the Russian
Empress. Imperial Russia's last chance to move further south
was lost in 1917 with Bolshevik renunciation of secret
Imperial government compacts made with the Allied powers.
Ironically, for Moscow this included British and French
guarantees for Russian territorial gains of Constantinople, the
Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara and both shores of the
Q i 6Bospnorus
.
In the aftermath of the Russian Revolution, Lenin, and
his successor Stalin, were primarily intent on securing the
internal security of the communist regime; however,
World War II enabled the Soviets to show that traditional
ambitions had not really abated. Pretentious Soviet-German
conversations were held in Berlin in November 1940. A secret
protocol was drawn up, but never signed, delineating spheres
of influence. With Stalin's approval, Foreign Minister Molotov
Lederer, p. 456.
A. S. Klieman, Soviet Russia and the Middle East
(Baltimore, 1970), p. 33.

7wrote that the Soviet government was prepared to accept the
protocol, "Provided that the area south of Batum and Baku in
the general direction of the Persian Gulf is recognized as the
center of the aspirations of the Soviet Union." Molotov's
negotiations also stressed the need for naval mobility. He
obtained German and Italian support for replacing the 1936
Montreux Convention. The Convention hindered the tactical
flexibility of the Soviet Black Sea Fleet because it
recognized Turkey's right to regulate warship traffic through
the Straits in time of war. Henceforth, the Soviet Union was
to have the right to unrestricted passage for its navy
through the Straits, and at any time. It is interesting to
note that Molotov's stipulations were not couched in Marxist
terms, but were plainly power political demands. The parallels
to Tsarist foreign policy are striking.
The July 1952 coup d
'
etat in Egypt led by a group of
army officers removed King Farouk from power and established a
military dictatorship. General Naguib was its nominal head,
but power was vested with Lieutenant Colonel Gamal Abdul
Nasser, who in the spring of 1954 became Egypt's acknowledged
Chief of State. The initial Soviet reaction to the new regime
was a mixture of reserve and hostility. The Kremlin believed
that the United States Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) elided
the revolutionaries in the coup. The American purpose was, in
Alvin Z. Rubinstein, ed
.
, The Foreign Policy of the
Soviet Union (New York, 1972), p. 1557

8Soviet eyes, to establish an Egyptian regime that would favor
ties with Washington in place of receding British control. The
Soviets maintained a general policy of denunciation of the new
o
Egyptian rulers till the end of 1954. Even the Anglo-
Egyptian agreement of July 1954, under which British troops
were to be withdrawn from the Suez Canal, was looked at
skeptically in Moscow. Again it was thought to be some type of
American plot by which the United States would secure greater
influence with Cairo, to be used to force Egypt into a
regional defense pact hostile to the USSR. On August 8, 1954,
Pravda stated that the agreement:
. . . does not guarantee Egyptian territorial
integrity. ... It threatens Egypt's peaceful
coexistence with other countries. In concluding the
agreement the Egyptian government is taking a
dangerous step towards supporting American plans for a
Middle East Command which is a direct threat to the
cause of peace in the Middle East.
9
Of chief concern to the Kremlin at that time was the
system of defense alliances that Secretary of State Dulles was
encouraging. Although the United States used the term
"containment" to portray its foreign policy vis a vis the USSR,
to the Soviets it was "capitalistic encirclement." Security of
the homeland was obviously of paramount importance to the
communist leaders and any program they could initiate to
forestall or obviate the "encirclement" of their country would
A. Yodfat, Arab Politics in the Soviet Mirror





9be implemented. The signing of the Baghdad Pact between
Turkey and Iraq in February 1955 (later that year joined by
Iran, Pakistan, and Great Britain) presented a new threat to
the Soviet Union in the form of a Northern Tier of Western
aligned states on its southern border. However, the price paid
by the West for the dubious advantage of bringing a single
Arab state, Iraq, into its alliance system proved exorbitant.
Formation of the Baghdad Pact created a community of
interest between Egypt and the Soviet Union where none had
existed before. Nasser, an ardent nationalist, vehemently
denounced the alliance as further evidence of Western inter-
ference in Middle East affairs and as a violation of the
Arab League. The Pact polarized the states of the region
between Iraq, which had joined the Western sponsored alliance,
and Egypt, which assumed leadership of the anti-Baghdad Arab
nationalist forces. It also had the effect of thrusting
Nasser into prominence as an outspoken leader of Arab states
opposing Western "imperialism." Nasser now shared with the
Soviet Union a set of common goals: to prevent other Arab
states from joining the Baghdad Pact; to undermine Iraq's
position as potential leader of a pro-Western group of Arab
states; and to eliminate remaining Western dominance in the
Arab world. And so, in 1955 when given the opportunity,
Moscow acted, and it appeared as though Nikita Khrushchev
remembered well what Lenin had earlier preached:
10Wiiliam R. Polk, The United States and the Arab World
(Cambridge, Mass., 1969), pp. TD^DT.

10
The more powerful enemy can be vanquished only by
exerting the utmost effort, and without fail, most
thoroughly, carefully, attentively and skillfully using
every, even the smallest, 'rift' among the enemies,
every antagonism of interest among the bourgeoisie of
the various countries . . . and also by taking
advantage of every, even the smallest opportunity of
gaining a mass ally, even though this ally be temporary,
vacillating, unstable, unreliable and conditional . H
The rift was present and the Soviet Union was soon to gciin an
ally, albeit unstable.
On April 16, 1955, just eight days after Khrushchev
consolidated his leadership within the Kremlin, the Soviet
Foreign Ministry issued a major policy statement. It
maintained that the Soviet Union could not remain indifferent
to the situation arising in the Near East brought on by the
formation of Western oriented "blocks" and the establishment of
United States military bases in the region. Portending action,
the statement concluded with:
. . . upholding the cause of peace, the Soviet
Government will defend the freedom and independence of
the countries of the Near and Middle East and will
oppose interference in their domestic affairs. 12
This was the first time the Soviets showed a willingness to
commit themselves to action in the Middle East on behalf of
local governments. For Egypt, it signaled a shift from the
antagonistic attitude Moscow had displayed toward the new
V. I. Lenin, "Left Wing" Communism , an Infantile
Disorder (New York, 194077~p7~5T.
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regime since the 1952 coup. The statement implied that the
Soviets would be willing to aid Cairo materially in its anti-
Westernization program.
Besides the formation of the Baghdad Pact, two other
events during this time period accelerated the establishment
of friendly relations between Cairo and Moscow. In the first
place, the Israelis made an extremely successful attack on
fortified Egyptian positions in the Gaza Strip in
February 1955 that was humiliating to the Egyptian Army.
Nasser had yet to win the near universal public support he
enjoyed after the 1956 Suez crises. He came to power with the
blessing of the army and he depended on it for his power base.
There was no doubt that he had to obtain weapons if he was to
satisfy the Revolutionary Command Council and secure Egypt's
borders, much less mount an offensive on Israel as he
] 3promised. " Secondly, Nasser went to the Afro-Asian Bandung
Conference in April and established himself as not just an
Egyptian leader, but as an Arab leader. This was noted in
Moscow, as was the fact that Nasser told Chou En-lai,
Communist China's representative, that Egypt needed arms and
the West was being unresponsive.
One of the general themes evolving from Bandung was
that Third World countries should be neutral in their foreign
13The Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) , comprised of
the inner core officers in the original Free Officers group,
remained at the top of Egypt's power structure till 1956.
After the Suez crisis, Nasser himself was able to pick men for




relations. That is, have no political leanings toward either
the capitalist or communist "camps." Nasser soon translated
that idea into Arab "positive neutralism," which affirmed a
country's right to deal on any level with all powers, no matter
what their political and ideological policies were.
The stage was set for a Soviet-Egyptian understanding.
Unable to purchase sizable quantities of weapons from the West
unless he met "anti-Arab" demands, Nasser initiated a request
to Moscow for assistance and he was not disappointed. The
initial arms arrangement was announced in September 1955 and
covered some $250 million in credits. ' There was no doubt
that the Soviets had adroitly capitalized on events of the
time. Taking advantage of the "rift" resulting from the
establishment of the Baghdad Pact, and with the use of military
aid they had entered Egypt, hence penetrated the Middle East.
An added attraction of attempting to gain a special
relationship with Egypt was that it was a large, populous
country with a relatively powerful army and a recognized
regional leader. Kremlin leaders probably felt that influence
in Egypt could well translate into influence with other Arab
states
.
Fayez A, Sayegh, The Dynamics of Neutralism in the
Arab World (San Francisco ,~T%£)7~P .~^83T
Wynfred Joshua, Sovi et Penetration into the Middle
East (New York, 197.1), p. 10.
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In January 1956 the Soviets extended a loan to Cairo
for approximately $150 million at two and one-half percent
interest to help launch its first five year plan calling for
industrial expansion. In February the two countries announced
an agreement whereby the Soviet Union would extend some
$2 million in credit to establish a nuclear physics laboratory
in Cairo. Later in the year Nasser accepted the Soviet offer
of aid to construct the Aswan High Dam, after the
United States withdrew its offer to help finance the first
stage. Thus, new ties were established. Russian (or
East European) weapons, rubles, and technical assistance went
to Cairo; diplomatic dialogue commenced in earnest; and Soviet
writers and theorists began to re-evaluate Egypt's position
vis a vis the Soviet system. Moscow had bypassed the
Northern Tier to obtain a foothold in Egypt--the next step was
to strengthen and justify its position.
Ideological Justifica tion
Nikita S. Khrushchev demonstrated flexibility in
adjusting Soviet doctrine to socioeconomic and political
developments in the Third World. He began the formal ideo-
logical justification for Soviet Union-Third World ties at the
20th Party Congress held in February 1956. Khrushchev largely
abandoned the concept of "capitalist encirclement" as it had
been somewhat self-defeating as by implication it regarded the
entire noncommunist world as hostile to the USSR. Instead,
Khrushchev said that "a vast 'peace zone,' Including both
socialist and non-socialist peace-loving states . . . has

14
emerged in the world arena." This shift from Stalin's
bipolar "two camp" thesis heralded a fundamental change in
Soviet policy toward under developed countries. Egypt was one
of the states mentioned which had recently won its
independence and was in the "peace zone." The Communist
leader further stated that these countries "need not go begging
for up-to-date equipment to their former oppressors. They can
get it in the Socialist countries, without assuming any
political or military commitments." ; Khrushchev also upheld
the contention that there was more than one road a nation could
take to realize socialism and he reaffirmed Lenin's position on
1 8peaceful coexistence. In effect, the Kremlin was officially
announcing its intention to become directly involved in the
affairs of Third World countries where it might be able to
capitalize on anti-colonial sentiments, internal instabilities,
or strained external relations.
Leo Cruliow, ed. , Current Soviet Policies II , The
Documentary Record of the 20th Party Congress and Its Aftermath





In 1959 Khrushchev elucidated the meaning of peaceful
coexistence: "Peaceful coexistence is a continuation of the
conflict between two social systems, but by peaceful means
without war. We consider this an economic, political, and
ideological struggle but not a military one. ' This definition
of peaceful coexistence has not yet been refuted by Soviet
leaders. V. D. Sokolovsky, ed
.




In 1957 a thorough Soviet reappraisal was made of
Egypt's 1952 "revolution" (it was no longer a military coup).
In revising the earlier line, the revolution was now said to
have enjoyed strong popular support. The Egyptian Army had
been solidly against the old government, the broad masses were
on the side of the army and had taken part in the July rising.
Most of the Egyptian officers had come from petty-bourgeois
circles, received low pay, and were linked by family ties with
the common people. This volte fac e, coming shortly after the
1956 Suez Crisis, simply acknowledged the fact that the Soviets
approved of Nasser's regime, while at the same time it made the
regime more palatable to Politburo members.
While a practical policy towards the Third World had
evolved by 1955-56, it took until 1960-61 for theory to be
fully wedded to the new reality. Khrushchev then instituted the
ideological innovations which modernized Marxist-Leninist
thought on developing areas so as to justify governmental
economic assistance to noncommunist countries. This ideo-
logical justification came through support for the concept of
"national democracy," first advanced by the 1960 Moscow
Declaration of 81 Communist Parties, and adopted at the
22nd Party Congress in October 1961. "National democratic
states" referred to those countries which adhered to anti-
Western foreign policies and pursued domestic programs aimed at
building socialism through a "non-capitalist path of
development." This new approach also sanctioned communist
cooperation with peasants and petty bourgeoisie in moving from

16
colonial dependency to socialism, without first moving through
the stage of capitalist revolution. Egypt was considered to be
a "national democratic state." If any of these states were
involved in war, internal or external, receiving Kremlin
approval, the action was categorized as a "national liberation
movement." Moscow maintained that since such movements were
caused by Western imperialism, they naturally merited Soviet
assistance.' Although "general" and "local" war was to be
avoided (they could lead to nuclear holocaust), in
January 1961 Khrushchev said that:
There will be wars of liberation as long as imperialism
exists, as long as colonialism exists. They are
revolutionary wars. Such wars are not only permissible
but inevitable. . . . What would our attitude be to
such uprisings? It would be most favorable. 20
The ideological framework that was erected so
"fraternal" ties could be selectively made with Third World
countries was thus completed.
B. Ponomarev, "Concerning the National Democratic
State," International Affairs
,
(Moscow), No. 8 (May 1961),
pp. 41-42.
Quoted in Brian Crozier, The Struggle for the Third
World (London, 1966), p. 23.

III. NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS
Despite temporary setbacks, the Soviet Union conducted
its policy in Egypt with a rational calculation of possible
gains over possible costs and with a deftness that led to
Cairo's military dependence on the Kremlin. Because Nasser was
not a communist, the Soviets did not really expect a
political coup in Egypt, rather, they were interested in
reducing Western power with a commensurate gain in Soviet
power. Soviet support for Egypt's progressive (anti-West)
foreign policy was paralleled by approval, though much less
enthusiastic, of its internal policy, ignoring such
disagreeable aspects as the outlawing of the communist party
and persecution of local communists. These ideological issues
were not forgotten, but were considered of secondary
importance, not worth the risk of dissolving a new, profitable
relationship.
It was the Arab- Israeli conflict that proved to be the
vehicle that the Soviets rode to continue making inroads into
the area. Because Moscow had no control over the regional wars
of 1956, 1967 and 1973, it did not view them favorably.
However, they, more than anything else, enabled the Kremlin to
solidify and perpetuate a Russian presence in Egypt.
The ill-conceived and poorly coordinated British-
French- Israeli attack on Egypt in October 1956 made Moscow
appear to be Egypt's protector and friend in need. On
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5 November when it became clear that the United States would
insist upon British, French and Israeli withdrawal from
Egyptian territory, Marshal Bulganin warned Israel that its
existence was threatened by its participation in the attack on
Egypt. Also, Britain and France were alerted to the fact that
they could come under attact by "every kind of modern
2]destructive weapon."' These bold threats, delivered even while
Russian tanks were moving to crush the Hungarian revolution,
definitely gained the Soviets politically valuable credit in
the Arab world. As for Nasser, the Suez crisis made him the
undisputed champion of the Arab cause. Even though the
Egyptian Army performed poorly, he got full control of the
Suez Canal and dealt "imperialism" a grievous blow.
In the two years between the Suez War and the over-
throw of the Iraqi Hashemites in the Baghdad coup of 1958, the
short term objectives that had originally brought the
Soviet Union into Egypt were essentially realized. Not only was
the West's attempt to incorporate the Arab states of the
Eastern Mediterranean into an anti-Soviet defense alliance
stymied, but the Baghdad Pact system was itself crippled by
Iraq's departure. With these initial objectives secured,
Moscow began to concern itself more directly with political
aims.
O I
Text of exchange of letters between Moscow, London and
Paris in Hugh Thomas, Suez. (New York, 1969), pp. 182-200.
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The 1958 overthrow of Iraq's pro-West government led
by General Kassem appeared to be a windfall for Moscow,
Kassem cooperated closely with the Iraqi communists and they
acquired many key governmental positions. The Soviet Union
offered to assist the new regime and several loans were made.
However, Soviet policy was hampered by the chronic inter- Arab
disputes; conflicts which compelled Moscow to make choices
between disputants. Nasser was backing the "Nasserites" and
others opposed to Kassem and the local communists; therefore,
Moscow's support for Kassem upset the Egyptian leader greatly.
At the same time, the Soviet Union was not favorably disposed
toward the 1958 Egyptian- Syrian merger (UAR) which led to the
suppression of the relatively influential Syrian Communist
22Party. Moreover, Nasser s refusal to reach a modus vivendi
with his own communists was a continuing source of irritation
to the Soviets. The result was an Russian-Egyptian feud,
touched off by Nasser's condemnation of communism in
December 1958 and lasting till 1961.
In the Soviet Union, Khrushchev did not hide the fact
that there were differences between the two countries; he
22
The United Arab Republic (UAR) was formed in
February 1958 and was a union between Egypt and Syria. When
Syria withdrew in SeDtember 1961, President Nasser continued
to call Egypt the UAR. In April 1971 the UAR, Libya, and
Syria agreed to join in a supranational federation to be
called the Confederation of Arab Republics. This action was
reported to be overwhelmingly approved by a plebiscite and in
September the UAR became the Arab Republic of Egypt (ARE). At
present writing each country conducts its own business and
there is minimal coordination between members.

20
spoke against the "curtailment of democracy" in Egypt, but he
always maintained that these differences should not interfere
23
with the friendly state-to-state relations. Soviet
financial and technical assistance continued despite tensions
during this period. In December 1958 an agreement was signed
on the construction of the first stage of the Aswan Dam. The
Soviets agreed to build the High Dam; to supply the necessary
equipment and specialists, and to grant a loan of $325 million
which Cairo would repay in Egyptian currency at two and
one-half percent interest. In August 1960 the agreement for
commencing construction on the second stage of the High Dam was
signed.
In 1961 Egypt's internal course took a progressively
more leftist course. The Egyptian-Syrian Union was
floundering and Nasser felt that one reason Syria had desired
secession was because of "capitalist reaction," which he felt
jeopardized his own rule in Egypt. The official break with
Syria came in the fall of 1961. Besides the blow to his
prestige which the secession caused, Nasser was plagued with a
stagnated economy which needed large infusions of capital to
keep it alive. Beyond these immediate considerations, there
was the long-range problem of enlarging the popular base of
23Walter Laqueur, The Struggle for the Middle East




the regime to gain wider legitimacy for the ruling elite. The
externally stalled revolutionary dynamic had to be switched to
internal revolutionary action to justify and consolidate the
leadership's power. Nasser's solution was to nationalize all
banks, industry, maritime transport concerns and public
utilities. Private land ownership was limited to 100 feddan
per person and 200 feddan per family (one feddan equals 1.04
acres). In a country where 99 percent of the people were
compressed onto 3.5 percent of the total land, making a popu-
lation density of more than 2,500 people per square mile, this
last act found support with the fellahin. But actually, no
real significant redistribution of land or economic wealth
took place. The Gross National Product grew at a rate of
about six percent for four years following nationalization--
mainly stimulated by substantial foreign borrowing- -but then
decelerated. Indeed, compared with other Middle East
countries during the 1960-70 period, Egypt was at the bottom of
25the growth list with an annual average growth of 4.2 percent.
Its CNP for 1970 was $5.87 billion, approximately $175 per
capita.
25Saudi Arabia and Iran were at the top of the list
with a 9.7 and 8.3 percent average growth rate respectively,
Syria, Iraq and Turkey experienced average rates of 6 to
6.5 percent. See Jahangir Amuzegar, "Ideology and Economic
Growth in the Middle East," The Middle East Journal
, 28,
No. 1 (Winter 1974), p. 5.
26
U.S. Department of State Publication 8152, "Egypt,'
(Washington, D.C., 197 3), p. 5.
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Initial Soviet reaction to the 1961 nationalization
decrees was favorable, but restrained. It was still a year of
mutual accusations and ideological disputes in USSR-UAR
forums, although the invective overtones had subsided. In
1962 a definite move toward reconciliation was begun. There
was a transition from reservation to approval in the Soviet
attitude toward the UAR. By 1963 the Soviets were hailing the
implementation of the 1961 nationalization decrees as being
in line with the interests of the whole Egyptian nation. They
were very much a "progressive phenomenon," a "social
revolution," and they clearly demonstrated that Egypt was on
27
the path of "non-capitalist development."
The Soviets and Egyptians healed their differences in
1962-63 as it was in the best interests of both to do so. If
Moscow was to be able to influence Egyptian and Arab policies,
it had to effect a rapprochement with Cairo, the foremost
power in the Arab world. As for Nasser, he needed an ever
increasing amount of arms and aid as his ambitious military
venture in Yeman, begun in 1962, strained both the resources
of the economy and the army. Moreover, in 1962 Moscow was
encouraged by the formation of a new Egyptian party organi-
28
zation, the Arab Socialist Union (ASU). The ASU is germane
Y. Rozeliyev, "State Capitalism in Asia and Africa,"
International Affairs
,
(Moscow), No. 2 (February 1963),
pp. 33-38.
The previous two parties, the National Liberation
Rally and the National Union, failed from lack of support
from either Nasser or the army.
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to this study because the Soviets saw and still see, in it a
means for realizing a larger role in Egyptian affairs. Soviet
attempts to influence members of the ASU through Egyptian
approved programs reached fruition in the late 1960's when
Soviet advisers were instrumental in convening study seminars
in Cairo and in setting up an ideological training center for
ASU members. Also, the Kremlin encouraged Nasser, later Sadat
,
to fill positions in the party organization with Egyptians
sympathetic to the Soviet Union.
Within the general framework of building an Egyptian
socialist society, the objective of the ASU is to maintain the
revolutionary drive by educating and organizing the masses.
It has structural similarities to the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union (CPSU), but more fundamental than its structure
is its leadership. Since its inception the ASU has been
dominated at the highest level by ex-officers sympathetic to
the regime. Also, these individuals usually hold an office in
the governmental structure. An interlocking relationship thus
exists at the top between the governmental and party
structures, which is quite similar to the Soviet system. The
ASU has approximately seven million members (one out of every
five compared to one out of every 18 in the CPSU) but there is
a significant lack of interest manifest by the members. In
fact, of the 38 percent of party members who did pay clues in
1972, most were workers or fellahin whose dues were auto-
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matically deducted from their pay. Full-time, salaried members
29
number only about 100.
While the ASU is supposed to be the main organ for
expression of Egyptian socialism, it did not develop as
expected in Moscow. Soviet calls, frequently repeated through-
out the 1960's, to establish "a vanguard party" within the
organization, which would become the country's leading force,
received verbal approval from UAR leaders but little imple-
mentation. In 1969 Pravda observed that: "Many resolutions of
the ASU National Congress mentioned v/ords 'socialist society'
and 'socialist measures.' This does not mean, of course, that
30
socialism has been built in the UAR." The ASU is not
considered in the USSR to be a party, but a "national front,"
uniting divergent groups, not always with identical interests,
which needs a "socialist vanguard" to guide and lead it.
After its reorganization in 1971, the Soviets warmed
considerably, saying the ASU "has in effect been completely
reconstructed," and an attempt was made "to create an
3]
effective, not just a formal, political organization."
Hrair Dekmejian, Egypt Under Masir (Albany, 1971)
pp. 145-153; Alvin Z. Rubins tein~~TTEgypt Since Nasser,"
Current History
, 62, No. 365 (Jan. 1973), p. 12.
Pravda
,
May 7, 1969. Except where otherwise noted,
Russian language citations are from the American Association
for the Advancement of Slavic Studies Current Digest of the
Soviet Press , a weekly journal of translations. Dates or
publication refer to the original Soviet source.
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In actuality, the ASU continues to function primarily
as an administrative and bureaucratic arm of the leadership,
and that is still centered in the military and executive. But
to return to events following the reconciliation effected
during 1962-1963.
In April 1964, in preparation for Khrushchev's May
visit, Nasser released some 400 political prisoners, many of
whom were communists, chereby giving tacit approval to their
existence in Egypt. The Soviet delegation was warmly received
in Cairo and Nasser received the "Hero of the Soviet Union" and
the prestigious "Order of Lenin" medals from Khrushchev, along
with a most complimentary citation. In his Aswan address,
Khrushchev reminded his friends that the "unity of the workers
of all nations" was a more important goal than any regional
unity; however, he also stressed Egypt's "progressive" nature.
At the farewell dinner in Cairo he announced a $280 million
loan for a large steel complex and other industries. Egypt's
pro-Soviet Prime Minister, Ali Sabry, went to Moscow in
September to complete arrangements for the new loan and while
there also acquired an additional $60 million for an agri-
cultural project.
Khrushchev's ideological and practical endorsement of
Nasser's regime, made during the May 1964 visit, met with
resistcince from the more orthodox ideologists in the Kremlin.
Although it is not yet clear who opposed his most recent
32 Ibid., May 15, 1964.
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pronouncements embracing Egypt, certain top members of the
Politburo felt that Egypt did not exemplify a "revolutionary
democratic state" on a "noncapitalist path of development."
This was one of the many things that led to extreme dissatis-
faction of "Khrushchevism, " which ultimately resulted in his
removal from power in October 1964. Khrushchev was replaced by
Leonid Brezhev as First Secretary of the CPSU and by
Alexei Kosygin as head of government. That the Soviet Union's
new leadership did not assume more of a hard line policy
towards Nasser was probably because of its open rivalry with
Communist China; the need not to "lose face" in the eyes of
other Third World countries; and the fact that the new leaders
probably objected mainly to the personality, not the ideology,
of the displaced Chairman.
Within a month of Khrushchev's demise, Field Marshal
Amer was dispatched to Moscow where he met with
Marshal Malinovsky, the Soviet defense minister, to assure him
that the UAR was looking forward to continued friendly
relations. To reinforce this theme Nasser supported the
Soviet's attempts to aid the Congolese "government in exile"
in late 1964. By December 1964 the Egyptians were flying
Soviet transports, loaded with Russian and Czech arms, to
Juba, Sudan, and from there the arms were moved to the eastern
Congo. On 23 December Nasser said that, "I hereby confirm that
For more on this subject see, Uri Ra'anan, "Moscow
and the Third World,". Problems of Communism , XIV, No. 1
(Jan. -Feb. 1965), 22-31.
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we have sent arms to the Congo--and we shall send more." The
very next day Aleksandr Shelepin, a leading member of the
Politburo who was in Cairo on an official visit, praised Egypt
for its socialist construction and its foreign policy,
especially in the Congo, and promised that economic aid would
o r-
be continued by Moscow's new leadership.
Nasser went to Moscow in August 1965 to discuss future
Soviet-Egyptian relations. While the Kremlin had opted for no
change to its basic policy towards the UAR, Nasser was no less
eager for Soviet support. he had by now come to depend on
Soviet military hardware and Egypt's economy, after an initial
upswing following the 1961 decrees was faltering.
Furthermore, his position in the Arab world had suffered: he
had quarrelled with Syria; there was open conflict with Jordan,
Saudi Arabia and Tunisia; and the war in Yemen was going badly.
Kosygin returned the visit nine months later. He told the
Egyptian National Assembly (now called the People's Assembly)
that he admired Egypt's social and economic progress and its
continuous anti- imperialist struggle, and he promised further
economic and military support.
In the ten years following 1955 the Soviet Union had,
for the most part, maneuvered skillfully to implant itself in
Egypt and the Middle East. There had been tangible benefits.
34Quoted in Tareq Y. Ismael, The UAR in Africa
(Evanston, 1971), p. 224.
35Pravda, December 25, 1964.
36
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Nasser had allowed the Soviets to make use of his country as a
strategic transit point for arms to the Congo, and Moscow was
to use the country as an intermediary to supply Yemeni rebels
with arms from 1965 to 1970. Cairo received military aid
totaling some $1.3 billion prior to the 1967 June War while the
Soviets were allowed to maintain some 500 military experts in
37Egypt to act as advisers and instructors. Among other things,
by introducing its military experts into the UAR and bringing
them into contact with local power elites, the arms-aid
program marked a notable departure from the continental
isolation to which the Soviet Union's military establishment
had previously been accustomed. As noted previously when
speaking of the ASU, Soviet advisers did not limit themselves
to their technical specialty. In 1966 a Soviet official wrote
that it was the experts' job not only to give assistance in
their "narrow specialty," but also to:
. . . give lectures on a wide variety of topics, to
propagate by all means at their disposal the truth
about the U.S.S.R. and the construction of the Communist
society. It is this type of indoctrination that lays
the foundations for the transition of these peoples
[Third World] to socialism, while bvpassing the painful
stage of capitalistic development.-^"
37
"The Arms Trade," Congressional Record, 115 No. 24
(Washington, D.C., 1969), 32093-95.
38
V. D. Shchctinin quoted in W. W. Kulski, The
Soviet Union _in World Affairs: _A Documented Analysis
4-197? "(New York, 1973), p. T%5.
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With these multiroled experts came the first KOMAR patrol
boats armed with Styx surface-to-surface missiles, and the first
modern MIC 21s, delivered in 1962-~by contrast the
North Vietnamese did not receive MIG 21s till late 1967, and
then only a very small number.
Egypt's well equipped armed forces allowed Nasser to
pursue an activist foreign policy and enabled him to maintain
his leadership in the Arab world. Nasser knew he was indebted
to Moscow and needed its active support in his crusade against
Israel, but he was careful to keep a grip on the country's
internal governmental machinery. It appeared that Nasser could
maintain close economic and military ties with the Soviet Union
while not sacrificing Egyptian independence. Although inter-
estingly enough, Khrushchev had once admitted that, "We value




The Arab- Israeli war of June 1967 supplied additional
cohesiveness to the Soviet-Egyptian relationship and marked the
beginning of a new era of substantial military involvement for
the USSR in the Middle East. With its sizable military and
economic aid programs and its consistent political support of
Egypt against Israel, Moscow had nurtured Cairo's expansionist
ambitions and kept tensions high in the region, Moscow's
warnings to Egypt about an impending Israeli attack on Syria
encouraged Nasser to move his troops into the Sinai and to
Quoted in U.S. Department of State, The Sino -
S
oviet





blockade the Straits of Tiran. On May 22, 1967, just two weeks
before hostilities began, Pravda reported that:
Israeli ruling circles openly threaten the start of an
armed intervention in Syria. . . . The Israeli Army
Command has ordered a partial mobilization of
reservists. Israeli troops are concentrated on the
Syrian border and are committing acts of provocation on
land and in the air.
Yet when the Israeli government offered to let the Soviets
inspect the border areas where the alleged "concentrations"
were, Moscow declined.
Apparently Soviet leaders miscalculated the regional
military balance or perhaps they would not have endorsed
Nasser's demands for the removal of the United Nations
Emergency Force (UNEF) , at any rate events rapidly slipped
beyond the Kremlin's ability to influence them decisively.
When the Juno War began the Soviet Union made clear by
its reactions the rank order of its objectives in the area. Its
immediate resort to the hot- line highlighted its overriding
interest in avoiding a superpower clash. For the USSR's
proteges, this meant there could be no direct Soviet inter-
vention- -but for Moscow diplomatic "points" could still be
scored. On 8 June Izvestia warned Israel that its actions
threatened to uproot the foundation and "the very existence" of
Israel. A Soviet Note to the Israeli government on
June 10, 1967, announced Moscow's decision to sever diplomatic
relations. Quite possibly the reason the Kremlin waited till
the day that hostilities were virtually over, was so not to
give the United States cause to believe that this was the first
step to its direct involvement, thereby risking a perilous
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confrontation. This late diplomatic move was reminiscent of
Soviet diplomacy in the Suez Crisis (and we will see another
example of it in October 1973).
Prompt rearmament of Egyptian forces after the war
indicated that Egypt remained the keystone of Soviet policy in
the Middle East. Head of State Nikolai Podgorny arrived in
Cairo in late June and Nasser pressed not only for arms but
also for increased Soviet personnel. Nasser realized that the
military forces' basic problem was lack of military competence;
the soldiers needed to gain confidence in themselves and their
superiors, and they needed esprit de corps . Within four
months, about 80 percent of Cairo's losses had been replaced.
New weapons were introduced into the Egyptian arsenal and
Soviet military advisers, numbering some 500 before the war,
were within a few months expanded to 3,000 officers. Never,
with the exception of Cuba, had the USSR deployed such large
numbers of its own military personnel outside the Warsaw Pact
area. By October 1968, the value of Soviet arms deliveries to
Egypt since June 1967 was estimated at $1.4 billion.
Shortly following the end of hostilities there was a
rash of Soviet articles castigating "reactionary" elements of
42
the Egyptian officer corps for allowing the Israeli victory.
'^Joshua, pp. 15-16.
^Laquenr, p. 82.
42For example see, Pravda, July 25, 1967; August 9, 1967;
Izvestia, July 23", 1967.
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In response to Soviet urgings to reorganize the Egyptian
command structure and to indoctrinate new officers, more than
600 officers were replaced including Marshal Amer. It was
obvious that the Kremlin had gained considerable influence in
Egyptian military affairs through generous amounts of arms aid.
Egypt's defeat caused consternation and embarrassment
in Moscow but there were basic reasons for staying with the
"game plan" of support for Egypt: it would have a deleterious
effect on other friendly and "noncommitted" Third World
countries if the Soviets were to cease support; it would give
China a golden opportunity to unleash further propaganda
attacks on Moscow; Nasser had managed to come through the
defeat as an Arab hero; and the confusion in Egypt resulting
from defeat presented Moscow an unprecedented opportunity for
gaining a greater degree of institutionalized control of the
country.
Kremlin leaders apparently decided that a continuing
flow of Soviet weapons to Egypt was the quickest and surest
way to gain this control. From mid June 1967 till Nasser's
death in September 1970, the most striking feature of the
Soviet-Egyptian relationship was the ever increasing arms
buildup of Egypt's armed forces, combined with a continued
influx of Soviet military advisers. By 1968 Russian crews were
flying their aircraft from Egyptian airfields and the Soviets
completely controlled six air bases by 1970. The flights
provided reconnaissance support and much needed air cover for
Soviet naval forces in the Mediterranean.
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Early in 1970, following a trip by Nasser to Moscow,
the Soviets energetically began to establish an up-to-date
surface-to-air missile (SAM) system in Egypt. This new move,
while in keeping with Moscow's policy of large scale arms aid,
was precipitated by two factors. First was the Israeli "deep
penetration" air attacks which reached the outskirts of Cairo
in December 1969 and January 1970. Nasser came under great
pressure to prove to his people, and the Arab world in general,
that he could defend the homeland. Rather than halting Egypt's
intensified artillery shelling along the Sinai front, in return
for a cessation of Israeli air raids, Nasser decided to turn to
Moscow for help. The second factor, from the Soviets view-
point, was Russian aircraft losses. From after the June War
to mid 1970 some 150 MIG fighter aircraft, piloted by
Egyptians, had been shot down in aerial duals. * The "war of
attrition" declared by Nasser had once again shown that
Israeli jets were masters of the air- -including Egyptian air-
space. Not having an unlimited number of modern fighter
planes, the Soviets recognized a need to provide Egypt with an
adequate air defense system.
By October 1970, 500 to 600 SAM launchers had been
systematically placed to cover the threat zones, about 200 of
the SAMs being within 19 miles of the Canal. Along with the
well known SA~2 missiles and antiaircraft guns, came SA-3
missiles. These improved SAMs, which the Soviet Union never
International Institute for Strategic Studies,
Strat egic Survey 1970' ( London , 1971), p. 48,
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did entrust to North Vietnam, were capable of coping with high
speed, low-flying attack aircraft. Some 12,000-15,000 Soviet
troops were sent to operate the new systems, and approximately
150 MIG-21Js were manned by Russian pilots in an effort to
upgrade the Egyptian Air Force. '' The insertion of the Soviet
air defense screen seriously affected the Egyptian- Israeli
military situation, as air supremacy is a crucial element in
the balance of forces between Arabs and Israelis. Israel's
deterrent strategy was based on the option of launching a
preemptive airstrike. The Soviet defense network rendered a
repeat performance of 1967 unlikely, as 1973 was to prove.
On the political scene, Nasser pleased Moscow by
announcing in 1968 his "March 30 program" (taken from a speech
on that day). The main feature of the new program, Pravda
said, was to shift the center of gravity of Egyptian
government from administrative agencies to the Arab Socialist
Union. The ASU would be reorganized and revitalized and its
governing council would become "the supreme body of the State."
The second feature of the program was a gradual replacement of
administrative officials by people who had "appropriate"
qualifications and were devoted to the revolution, "This part
of the program can be qualified as a refusal to use the army as
the main source to replenish all links of the machinery of
state." 4 The program was not pushed with any particular vigor
44Ibid., p. 49
45Pravda, April 29, L968
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ill 1969-1970 as Nasser was more caught up in maintaining his
power base, trying to arrest the country's economic decline, and
reconsolidating his leadership standing vis a vis other Arab
States.
Nasser's sudden death in late 1970 closed an era of
Soviet-Egyptian relations that had, in sum, seen the two
countries expand and strengthen military, economic and
political ties.
The chronological sequence will now be temporarily
abandoned in order to investigate an important, and heretofore
little mentioned, aspect of the Soviet Union's presence in
Egypt.

IV. MOSCOW'S NAVAL DIPLOMACY
The Arab-Israeli War in June 1967 moved Soviet-Egyptian
relations to a new plane that had profound effects on the depth
of Soviet involvement in the Middle East. One of the most
dramatic manifestations of the USSR presence following the
June War was the growth of the Soviet Mediterranean Squadron.
Because the Soviets saw this naval force as another means of
projecting their presence into the region, and as Egyptian
support was, and still is, considered essential for maximum
effectiveness of the now much expanded squadron, it behooves us
to examine Moscow's naval diplomacy as it relates to the
Middle East.
a .1.-. :
Soviet Navy since 1956 and a member of the Central Committee,
rationalizes that a great power which lacks substantial naval
forces will ultimately join the ranks of second-rate powers. He
holds that Napoleon could have conquered Egypt in 1789 if the
French Navy had been stronger. ' Gorshkov maintains that the
Soviet Navy played a "decisive role in frustrating the
adventurous plans of the Israeli aggressors" in the June War,
46 S. G. Gorshkov, "Navies in War and Peace," U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings, 100, No. 1 (Jan. 1974), p. 25.
I hesitate to rnalee" an analogy between France and the USSR in
Egypt, but Gorshkov' s tone makes one wonder what would have
-ened in the 1956 Suez Crisis if the Soviets had possessed i
powerful Mediterranean fleet.
47 Pravda, July 30, 1967.
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but actually there was no tactically strong Soviet presence in
the Mediterranean till after June 18, 1967--well after the
military situation had been resolved. Since that time, the
Soviet fleet has consisted of a balanced force, though lacking
adequate air cover, of about 40-43 ships (this number doubled
during the 1973 October War but then returned to the pre-war
level). Present in the force are ALLIGATOR type landing ships
which carry eight to ten tanks plus naval marines. This gives
the Russians an amphibious capability to make at least small
unopposed landings from waterways of the region, thus creating
the possibility for future Soviet fait accomplis in areas
where even small-scale operations might have large political
consequences
.
The initial impetus for the creation of the
Mediterranean squadron in 1964 came from a strategic need to
degrade the nuclear offensive capabilities of the
United States Sixth Fleet. However, since June 1967 there has
been increased emphasis on being able to project a political
presence through the use of naval forces operating throughout
the entire area. In 1967 Gorshkov praised:
. . . the crews of the ships sailing in the
Medierranean Sea, who are fulfilling the responsible
task of safeguarding the state interests of the
Soviet Union in this region. /+ 8
The term "state interests" covers much ground and undoubtedly
includes the use of limited naval force to achieve diplomatic
ends. In 1969 Radio Moscow reported that "a new power has
48 iCrasnhaya Zvezda , February 11, 1967.

38
has appeared in the Mediterranean, the Soviet Union. Its
presence there has political, psychological and military
49importance."" Sir John Hamilton, former Commander-in-Chief
Allied Forces Mediterranean, felt that the presence of the
Soviet fleet had a profound effect on the local inhabitants and
in this respect it contributed significantly to the rise of
Soviet influence in the Mediterranean area. In January 1968
Radio Baghdad announced:
The Soviet Union, by its military maneuvers and by
moving about its fleet units in the Mediterranean, has
given the proof that it is not prepared to water down
the Middle East question. . . .51
In May, Tunisia's President Bourguiba noted that the deployment
of Soviet naval forces to the area had undermined the old
52balance of power, previously in favor of the West,
Tn Sentember 1969 Soviet ships conducted amphibious
exercises with the Egyptian and Syrian Navies, which have been
supplied with a number of landing craft and coastal defense
vessels. These were the first instances of combined maneuvers
with. Arab navies and underscore the degree to which the Soviet
Navy had become involved in the region.
By moving into the Mediterranean Sea, the Arabian Sea
and the Indian Ocean, the Soviet Navy itself acted as a
Z'r90uoted in Soviet Sea Power, Center for Strategic and
I n t emat iona I S tud i e s (WashingUoh , D . C . , 1969), p . 59.
^United States Congress, House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services, The Changing Strategic Naval
ce, U.S.S.R . vs U.S.A. , "(Washington, D.C., B6"8)7"p. 31.
Quoted in Klieman, p. 83.
52Thomas W. Wolfe, Soviet Power and Europe 1945- 1970
(Baltimore, 1970), p. 342."
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flexible "southern border" far from the Russian heartland, thus
giving added protection to the nation. Also, the Soviet fleet
provided a direct and continuous military link to non-
contiguous Middle East countries. A secure link with Arab
states never before existed as the Soviet Union has had no
friendly border countries through which it could move to reach
its Arab allies. This dilemma of not having the means or
ability to support policy aims--that is, no credible navy--had
in the past seriously ciffected Soviet strategy.
Stalin twice found that his lack of naval povzer in the
Mediterranean dictated a shift in plans. First, during the
Spanish Civil War, Russian merchant ships engaged in
supplying the Republicans with materials were often
interfered with, even sunk, and though the Kremlin protested,
without a navy the protests went unheeded. The second
instance occurred in .1948. Stalin felt that the revolt in
Greece had no chance of success because of the presence of
powerful Western navies. he is quoted as saying:
What do you think, that Great Britain and the
United States-- the United States the most powerful
State in the world--will permit you to break their line
of communications in the Mediterranean Sea. Nonsense,
and we have no navy. The uprising in Greece must be
stopped, and as quickly as possible.
"
Navies have certain inherent advantages over land or
air forces which the Soviets have put to good use in Egypt. A
navy can be seen, or not seen, and therefore if used properly




it produces no local resentment, as an encamped army is bound
to provide. Also, a navy retains the ability to intervene
without automatically incurring a greater national commitment
while at the same time promoting national objectives. An
example of this occurred a month after the June War had ended.
On July 10, amid much favorable publicity, a dozen Soviet
warships visited Port Said and Admiral Molochov announced that
"we are ready to cooperate with Egyptian armed forces to repel
any aggression." This bold declaration was reinforced and
gained real credibility shortly thereafter when units of the
Soviet fleet sailed purposely into Egyptian ports immediately
after the sinking of the Israeli destroyer Elath
,
effectively
deterring Israeli retaliation against Egyptian ships in their
harbors. This act of "gunboat diplomacy" in support of Cairo
had the desired impact on the populace. In 1968 Nasser
welcomed the Soviet Navy to Egyptian shores, calling it the
"new shield of the progressive Arab States."
From that time on Soviet warships made extensive use of
Port Said and Alexandria as "facilities" ("base" implies a loss
of sovereignty) for completing ship repairs, refueling and
resupply. By allowing Soviet ships to use Egyptian ports on a
routine basis, Nasser set a precedent for other countries i.n
54Quoted in Randolph and Winston Churchill, The Six Day
War (Boston, 1969), p. 207,
Quoted in Waiter Laqueur, "Russia Enters the Middle
East," Fo reign Affairs 47, No, 2 (Jan. 1969), p. 299.

41
the region. By 1970 the Russians had obtained agreements to
use the port facilities at Messewa, Ethiopia; Ilodeida, Yemen;
Berbera, Somalia; Latakia, Syria; and Vishakhapatnam, India.
More recently, Soviet naval combatants and support ships have
had unlimited access to the expanded Persian Gulf Iraqi naval
port of Umm Qasr, where facilities are being built with the
assistance of Soviet technicians. Also, since 1971 Soviet
naval units have been engaged in harbor clearance and
construction operations at Chittagong, Bangladesh.
In 1970 a writer for the Red Star commented:
The age old dreams of our people have become a reality.
The pennants of the Soviets ships now flutter in the
most remote corners of the sea and oceans. Our Navy is
a real force and possesses the ability to resolve
successfully the tasks of defending the state interests
of the Soviet Union and of the whole socialist world. 56
While this may be <x soi Inflated stai t, the Soviets
certainly did expand and strengthen their naval power in the
Mediterranean-Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean area between
June 1967 and the end of 1.970---and the growth did not stop
then
.
For example, prior to 1968 the Russian Navy spent less
than 100 ship days annually in the Indian Ocean and in 1968 it
compiled 1800 ship days there. During 1972 this figure had
leaped to 8800 ship days. ' The strength of the Soviet naval
Cited in David Fairhall
?
Russia Looks to the Sea
(London, 1971), p. 261. The SovieclTassisLea ih" developing the
ports of Hodeida, Berbera, Latakia, and Vishakhapatnam. They
also helped construct the Indian naval base at Vizog, in the
Andaman I s Iand s
.
New York Times , January 25, 1974, p. 6.
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force operating in the northwest Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea




The increased presence throughout the region was to a
large measure made possible by the new de facto Soviet bases
that facilitated the repair and upkeep of warships, allowing
for longer "on station" time and improved operational
efficiency. While foreign "installations" served Moscow's
interests, the Soviets viewed overseas "bases" as something
evil
:
Military bases on foreign territories create a serious
threat to the peace. Such bases serve as a source of
the outbreak of military conflicts and threaten the
freedom and independence of the peoples. 59
This dissonance between what one says and what one does may be
attributed to Soviet dialectic thinking or. more conceivably,
to analytical reasoning and pragmatic goals.
The special relationship existing betv/een Moscow and
Cairo ensured the Soviet Navy an anchorage in Egyptian ports
while, because of unpredictable internal upheavals, the navy's
use of other Arab ports south of the Suez Canal was more
CO
United States Congress, House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on the Near East and South Asia, United States
Interest In and Policies Toward South Asia (Washington, D.C.,
1973), p. 51; and New York Timers
,
March 6, 1975, p. 12. In
contrast, the United States Navy maintains a permanent force of
two destroyers and one auxiliary in the same area.




tenuous (bear in mind that Ras Banas , Egypt's Red Sea port, was
open for Soviet use). Since Cairo could be relied on for these
bases, Egypt quite naturally acquired a particular geographical
significance for the navy.
When the Soviets had to leave Egypt in July 1972 (more
on this in Section V), the navy was not deprived of its
"visitation rights" to Egyptian ports, but, because of
strained Soviet-Egyptian relations, Soviet warships were not
given the favored treatment that they had previously received.
Consequently, the squadron began to operate primarily from the
Syrian port of Latakia. And yet, for the Kremlin's naval-
planners, Egypt retained its geostrategic importance. This was
(1) because its southern port, Ras Banas, could provide
facilities for the navy's Indian Ocean flotilla; (2) because
Alexandria and Port Said were superior to Latakia in terms of
berthing, repair capability, and storage area; and (3) because
the Suez Canal retained its potential strategic importance.
An operational Suez Canal would substantially add to the
efficacy and mobility of the Soviet Mediterranean naval forces.
All Soviet warships, including the 45,000 ton V/STOL aircraft
carrier Kiev, can navigate the Canal. On the other hand, the
size of United States aircraft carriers presently precludes
their use of the Canal. At present, Admiral Gorshkov's ships
operating In the vicinity of the Persian Gulf come from
Vladivostok, steaming some 2500 miles further than if they
could come from the Black Sea naval base of Sevastopol via the
Canal, and some 3500 miles further than if they could depart
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from Alexandria or Port Said. Obviously, the Soviets would
like to reduce this extended line of communication with its
attendant logistic problems.
The Russian merchant fleet also has an interest in a
reopened Canal. In its last year of operation, ten million tons
of Soviet merchant shipping traversed that waterway, making
the USSR the Canal's seventh highest user.
An operational Suez Canal would not only be beneficial
militarily and commercially, but could prove to be politically
important. One could think of a situation like that of
July 1968, when Russian warships entered Egyptian ports after
the Elath was sunk so as to deter a retaliatory Israeli strike
against Egyptian naval vessels. In the projected hypothetical
situation, units of the Soviet Navy would move into the Canal
during an Arab-Israeli flare-up. Cairo would announce the fact
that it had invited such a presence and Moscow would give
Israel some appropriate warning as to what would happen if
Israeli forces interfered with the freedom of movement of
Soviet naval vessels in the Canal. In effect, by its physical
presence the Soviet Union could, as a neutral country, protect
Egyptian territory and targets.
Another waterway in the area which commands attention
is the Strait of Hormuz, connecting the Persian Gulf to the
Culf of Oman and Indian Ocean. Through this Strait passes
more than 400 tankers per week carrying some 50 percent of all
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Middle East oil. Access to the oil producing Gulf states
through the Strait is essential to the livelihood of
Western Europe and Japan; therefore, control of this choke-
point during a crisis period is a vital factor for consid-
eration. The Soviet Navy's Indian Ocean force has maintained
a presence near the Persian Gulf since 1970 and has often
transited the Strait of Hormuz to visit the Iraqi naval base,
Umm Qasr. In fact, in 1973 Soviet warships made more visits
to Iraq (Umm Qasr) than they did to any other country in the
region. An operational Suez Canal and use of Egyptian ports
would enable the Soviet Med i. terranean fleet to project consid-
erable military strength to the Gulf area which would not go
unnoticed by weak, yet oil rich, Gulf Shaykhdoms . This is one
reason, among others, why Moscow now wants to re-establish
good relations with Cairo.
While the Russian Navy's mission includes the
historic role of "showing the flag," the use of Soviet naval
diplomacy In the Middle East can now take additional forms.
During the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war the Soviets
temporarily more than doubled their Mediterranean force, from
43 to approximately 98 ships, which, aside from a simple show
Central Intelligence Agency, Issues in the Middle East
(1973), p. 34.
"Elmo R. Zumwalt Jr. "Strategic Importance of the
Indian Ocean," Armed Force s Journal I nternational III, No. 8
(April, 1974), p. 29.
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of force to bolster Arab morale, indicated that Moscow sees
the region as strategically important and intends to protect
its gains. There can be no doubt that Egypt, because of its
importance to the Soviet Navy, figures prominently in the
tactical and strategic considerations of Kremlin leaders.
We will now return to the historical sequence of
Soviet policy in Egypt.

V. POLICY SINCE NASSER
President Nasser's death on September 28, 1970,
reemphasized to Soviet leaders that the continuation of
existing relations between both countries, the fate of the
Soviet presence and of the large Soviet investment, were to a
great extent dependent on the regime in Egypt and, to a certain
extent, on whom would be Nasser's successor. Prime Minister
Kosygin and his party of Marshal Zakharov, General Lashehenko
and Colonel Okunev left immediate!}/ for Cairo where they stayed
from September 29 to October 3, 1970. The predominant military
makeup of the party suggested that the Soviets did not hesitate
to underscore the dependent military relationship which
existed between the two counl ries. On 1 October Kosygin, in a
message to the nation over Cairo radio, pledged continued
Soviet support in all fields and expressed confidence that the
death of Nasser would not create a vacuum that would weaken the
country. ' At the close of the visit the joint Soviet-
Egyptian communique declared:
. . . the governments of the Soviet Union and the United
Arab Republic have always regarded the friei
relations between the two countries as a stable factor,
untouched by the various turns in international
developments
. . . mutual determination was expressed to
fostering on the previous basis, the close ties of
friendship and cooperation. 63
62New York Times
,
October 2, 19 70, p. 16
63Pravda, October 4, 1970.
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The semi-official Cairo newspaper, Al Ahram, was quoted by the
Soviet journal New Times as saying that the USSR "is the only
source of our military might . . . without the Soviet Union we
would have no choice but to accept the victors terms." It also
quoted acting President Sadat as saying that:
. . . politically, militarily and economically the
Soviet Union has stood, and is standing by us uncon-
ditionally. There are rumors abroad that it is seeking
to soviet ize our country and its economy. They are all
false. The Soviet Union is an honest and true friend. 64
Anwar Sadat, Nasser's vice president and one of the
original Free Officers who overthrew King Farouk, was described
by the New York Times in 1970 as a left-of-center politician
who held an uncompromising anti- Israeli position. ' He was
sworn in as President on October 18 of that year and on
November 13 he was "unanimously elected" chairman of the
Arab Socialist Union. Shortly after becoming President, Sadat
announced that the country would be guided by Nasser's
"March 30 program." The country was to be transformed into a
modern society based on democracy, science and technology. At
the end of the year, Ali Sabry, now one of two Vice Presidents,
went to Moscow to discuss further economic assistance. There
he laid the groundwork for a $415 million loan, officially
announced in March 1971, to be used by Cairo for industrial and
rural improvement projects. And so, it initially appeared as
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Three events of importance in 1971 affected Soviet-
Egyptian relations. First, the May dismissal of
Vice President Sabry which signalled the start of a consoli-
dation of power by Sadat; second, a Treaty of Friendship and
Cooperation between the two countries was ratified; and third,
the role Cairo played in the Sudan coup.
The governmental shake-up which began on 2 May with the
dismissal of pro-Soviet Sabry and five ministers, including
Minister Mohammed Fawzi, was said to have taken place
because of an alleged conspiracy against Sadat by several top
officials. General Sadek, the Chief of Staff, took the War
portfolio and it was probably he that assured Sadat of the
army's support throughout the crisis period. In all, 91 former
high officials were put on trial for "high treason" in
August 1971 and most were sentenced to prison. Many of these
officials heLd positions in the ideological secretariat of the
ASU and were strong supporters of the Soviet Union, or were
communist "sympathizers
. There is another school of thought
that contends that the dismissal of Sabry was intended as a
signal to Washington that Cairo was prepared for renewed ties
with the West. This is because of Lhe particular timing of
Sabry 's demise. It occurred just three days prior to the
arrival of Secretary William Rogers, the first official visit
of a United States Secretary of State to Egypt since 1953.
At any rate, Moscow could not have been pleased with the new
events. It reacted to Sadat's "reorganization" by sending
Nikolai Podgorny, number three man in the ruling triumvirate,
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to Cairo on May 25 to make sure that internal political changes
would not endanger the Soviet position in Egypt.
The Soviet-Egyptian Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation
signed in Cairo on Hay 27, 1971, was the result of the
Podgorny-Sadat talks. It was hailed by both parties as a mile-
stone in their friendly relations.
There was no question but that the treaty was, at that
time, a diplomatic landmark in Soviet-Egyptian relations.
Articles 5, 7 and 8 appeared to open possibilities for increased
Soviet influence in Egypt. Article 5 said that the UAR and
USSR would "expand and deepen all-round cooperation and the
exchange of experience in the economic, scientific and techno-
logical fields." They would also expand trade and maritime
shipping between the two countries "on the basis of the
principles of mutual benefit and most-favored-nation
treatment." Article 7 pledged the two countries to consult
together regularly "on all important questions affecting the
interests of both States." It addi I:
In the event of situations developing which, in the
opinion of both sides, create a danger to peace, they
will contact each other without delay in order to
concert their positions with a view to removing the
threat that has arisen or restoring peace.
Article 8 said that the two countries would "continue to
develop cooperation in the military field" and added:
Such cooperation will provide specifically for
assistcince in the training of UAR military rsonnel and
in mastering the armaments and equipment supplied to the
UAR. . . ,6b





Never before had the two countries been legally linked to one
another, and interestingly never before had the Soviet Union
signed such a politico -military treaty with a Third World
nation.
The Soviets now had an internationally recognized
treaty that would enable them to strengthen their ties with
Egypt, and by various means. International Affairs (Moscow)
reported that:
Soviet-Egyptian cooperation has become a model of
relations between a socialist state and a revolutionary-
democratic regime in a country fighting for national
revival . . . no document in the history of Soviet-Arab
relations compares with this treaty in the scope of the
problems it covers. . . . The Soviet presence in the
Middle East is a political reality which cannot be
brushed aside under any circumstances . The Soviet
presence strengtheiis the anti-irnperialist front and
frustrates the plans of the Israeli hawks and their
U.S. patrons."'
There is some speculation that Sadat signed the Treaty
of Friendship as a quid pro quo to keep the Soviets from
meddling in his domestic affairs--on the side of Ali Sabry. It
is difficult to defend this theory because of Sadat's plans for
the fight against Israeli. In July, not quite two months after
signing the treaty, he promised the Egyptian people, in an
important speech to the ASU, that 1971 would be "the year of
decision" in the Arab-Israeli conflict. If by some clairvoyance
he had known there would be a peace settlement favorable to
Egypt, then perhaps he could discount Soviet military aid. But,
E. Dmitriev, "Soviet-Arab Friendship: A New Stage,"




realistically it was impossible for the Egyptian armed forces
to back his statement without Soviet help. So, even if the
Russians had chosen to try and influence Egypt's internal
realignment, Sadat would have signed the treaty- -his need for
Soviet arms was paramount.
The third event in 1971 directly affecting Moscow-
Cairo relations was the Sudan rebellion. In July the
Sudanese Communists led a successful coup against
Premier Ja'afar Numeiry's government. Sadat reportedly
refused a request by Soviet ambassador Vinogradov that Egypt
recognize the new regime. He is said to have told the
ambassador, "You should know that we Arabs will never be
Marxist. That is why we cannot allow a Communist regime to
68
exist in the Arab world." t then actively supported
pro-Numeiry forces in a successful counter-coup, despite
Soviet urgings to the contrary. However, the tension created
by Cairo's independent and anti-Soviet stand subsided in view
of the continuing Arab-Israeli conflict. Muhammad Heikel,
editor of the Al - Ahram and at that time still a power in the
government, wrote that the Arabs could not afford to
alienate the Soviet Union, whose support was then essential
69in the stand against Israel.
Quoted in Jaan Pennar, The U.S.S.R. arid the Arabs ;









Another event that occurred in 1971 that again illus-
trated the basic ideological schism between Egypt and the USSR,
V7as that a new Constitution went into effect. In its 193
articles, the Constitution-- the first to be given to Egypt since
the 1952 revolution, and replacing the provisional
Constitution of L964-- incorporated many of Sadat's promises to
restrict the powers of the country's security forces, to
guarantee the rule of law and to safeguard the freedom of
individual citizens. While 1 the country was declared a
"democratic and socialist State based on the alliance of the
working forces of the people," religion remained a basic force.
Article 2 stated: "Islam is the religion of the State. The
principles of Islamic legislation constitute the essential
source of the law." Islamic belief and traditions have
certainly remained powerful, forces in Egyptian society; Sadat
himself is a devout Muslim.
The year 1972 saw a significant and unexpected
development in Soviet-Egyptian relations. On 18 July
President Sadat ordered the immediate withdrawal of Soviet
military troops, advisers, and experts from Egypt, and demanded
that all Soviet equipment and bases on Egyptian territory be
placed under the exclusive control of Cairo. There were
several reasons for Sadat's move that need to be considered.
Keesj.ngs' Contemporary Archives Vol. XVIII
( ] 9 7 ! - I ::7777-^T;-25UF5^5¥:
Text of Sadat's statement in New York Time s,
July 19, 1972, p. J.5.
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The fundamental reason for expelling the Soviets
stemmed from the fact that there was (and continues to be) an
asymmetry in Mo scow- Cairo policy aims. The asymmetry became
more pronounced in the early 1970s. Attention was focused on
the question: Should Egypt take any and all steps necessary to
regain the Israeli occupied territories and end the "no war, no
peace" status quo, or should Cairo limit itself solely to
diplomatic measures aimed at resolving these problems?
Moscow's view, unswerving since late 1967, was that there
should be a peaceful (diplomatic) resolution of the Arab-
Israeli conflict based on the Arab interpretation of the
United Nations Security Council Resolution 242 of
November 22, 1967, i.e. Israel must return to its pre- 1967
borders as a prerequisite for commencing substantive peace
negotiations. The Kremlin's stand neatly allowed it (1) to
take advantage of continuing tension caused by "no war, no
ce"; (2) to continue active diplomatic backing for
"client" Arab states; and (3) to avoid jeopardizing detente
policies. By mid 1972, detente, with its much needed attendant
economic and technological benefits, was a program to which
Mr. Brezhnev and some other Soviet leaders were intimately
linked. Its importance overshadowed many other policy inputs
that figured into Moscow's equation for global strategy--ono of
these inputs being the Egyptian factor.
As for Cairo, by not having world wide interests, It
could well afford a narrower outlook. Among other things, it
wanted Egyptian territory taken as a result of the 1967 June
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War returned; if superpower detente suffered as a consequence,
so be it. President Sadat came to the conclusion that a major
military action was needed to set in motion the delayed
process of regaining occupied Arab lands. In July 1971 he
officially announced to the Arab Socialist Union that 1971
would be the "year of decision" in the struggle against Israel.
He then made three trips to Moscow within seven months and it
is logical to assume that he tried to convince Soviet leaders
of the feasibility for implementing stated aims through the use
of military force. However, to preclude prejudicing its
overall foreign policy aims, Moscow remained adamant in its
insistence that there be no new Arab-Israeli war. The press
reports and joint communiques released after each of Sadat's
trips were essentially identical: the Soviets promised to
fake measures aimed at "increasing" or "strengthening" Egypt's
"military might," yet they never advocated anything stronger
than calling for a:
. . ."just settlement in the Near East based on the
fulfillment of all the provisions of the
November 22, 1967 Security Council resolution, first of
all the withdrawal of Israeli troops from all the Arab
territories occupied in L967.72
There was no hint of approval for renewed military moves,
though Moscow had not hesitated in the past to call for
military action to support "just" causes.
72Coverage of Sadat s three trips in Pravda,
October 9, 13 and 14, 1971, February 5 and 6, 1972,
April 30, 1972; and Izvestia, October 1.5, 1971,




The Kremlin was able to wield a "war veto" primarily
because of the influence it had in Egyptian military affairs.
Recall that there were still some 5,000 Soviet advisers in the
Egyptian military structure, some 12,000-15,000 Soviet troops
manned virtually all the more advanced SA-3 SAM sites that
constituted Cairo's front line air defenses and Soviet pilots
were active in the airborne defense role.
A L though Sadat undoubtably pushed for Soviet approval
of Egyptian military plans during his three visits to Moscow
(October L971, February and April 1972), the Egyptian leader
maintains that he very frankly told Brezhnev at their last
meeting in April that Egypt must fight—there was no other
alternative. The Communist Party leader's answer was that he
7 3did not want a superpower confrontation, in other words, he
had more than simply Egyptian problems to consider, (After
Mr. Nixon was re-elected President in November 1972, Sadat
received a letter from Brezhnev that again emphasized detente
policies and contended that the present Middle East situation
would have to be accepted, or at least not changed through
resort to arms. ) And so, in order to rid himself of Moscow
restraining hand, President Sadat, in July 1972, ordered the
Soviets out of Egypt. As he later admit tc
to give myself complelo freedom of action,
ted, "I expelled them
75
73Sunday Time s (London), December 9, 1973, p. 33.
74Ibid
., p. 33.
;Quoted in (Sui Times [London] Insight Team),
Insight on the Midd] t War ("London, 1974), p. 33.
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In this Instance, the difference in Moscow-Cairo
policy aims --a part of the asymmetry in their relationship-
-
resulted in a dramatic decrease of the Soviets presence and
influence in Egypt.
Four other factors that had a positive impact on
Sadat's decision to expel the Soviets from Egypt are worth
mentioning. First, although the Soviets did promise to
strengthen Cairo's armed forces, they were either slow to act
or did not deliver the weapons that Cairo requested- -such as
the variable geometry wing MIG-23 and the medium range
SCUD-.C surface-to-surface missile. In a speech to the
Arab Socialist Union Sadat sa.i.d that after the signing of the
Egyptian-Soviet friendship treaty in May 1971, it had been
clearly laid down that the USSR would (furnish Egypt with
specific types of arms and by specific dates, for the battle
with Israel. "But," he said, "these armaments did not arrive
on the stipulated dates." Second, a general feeling of
animosity- existed between high ranking Egyptian officers and
Soviet advisers which was definitely a factor. The chief
Soviet military adviser to Defense Minister Sadek \
expelled from Egypt in February 1972, reportedly for publicly
criticizing Egyptian military ability. That appeared to be an
isolated action, but it reflected the growing breach between
the Egyptian military and its Soviet advisers. Seemingly, by
K
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July this breech had widened. Sources in Lebanon reported that
the Egyptian command threatened Sadat with a coup d ' etat if he
did not have the USSR recall its advisers. If true, Sadat
could not have ignored such a warning. Defense Minister Sadek
was said to be the main instigator of anti-Soviet feeling
within the Army. Third, Cairo was annoyed with the outcome
of the Nixon-Brezhnev Summit meeting (May 1972) in Moscow. The
two superpower leaders agreed that strife in the Middle East
was to be avoided and called for "support of a peaceful
settlement in accordance with Security Council Resolution
78
No. 242." Sadat felt that his program against Israel had
been compromised by the Kremlin for detente and enhanced
Soviet-American relations. Fourth, Soviet-Iraqi relations had
recently become much closer with the signing of their
Friendship Treaty on April 9, 1972 (along the same lines as the
Egyptian-Soviet treaty). A year before the Russians had
Loaned Baghdad $210 million, they were developing Iraq's
North Rumaila oil field, and their support had enabled
President Bakr to nationalize the Iraq Petroleum Company
(consortium of American, British, Dutch and French firms) in
June, 1972, The delicate power relationships between rival
Arab states could be easily upset by Soviet favoritism to the
77New York Times
,
July 21, 1972, p. 1.
7 P
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Bakr regime and it was conceivable that Sadat was looking for
something that would, in addition to giving himself
maneuvering room, promote his standing among the more
conservative, oil rich Arab States.
In sum, the expulsion of Soviet troops from Egypt in
July 1972 was, as Sadat in effect has said, necessary to combat
Moscow's veto of Cairo's war plans. Such things as friction
between Egyptian officers and their Soviet advisers,
unfulfilled orders of certain types of arms, and increased
Soviet interest in Iraq all added to a frustrated Egyptian
rship checked by Soviet global strategy.
The Soviets were caught by surprise by Sadat's
expulsion order, however, they did pull out "meekly" because
they really had no option. If they had insisted on staying,
their credibility with the Third World would have vanished and
this would have caused irreparable harm to their foreign
policy programs and aims. Within three short weeks approx-
imately 20', 000 Soviet military personnel were withdrawn and by
year's end only some 700 highly technical advisers remained.
Soviet-Egyptian relations remained in a state of flux
from July 1972 to October .1973.
The Kremlin indicated its displeasure with the July
expulsion order by halting the flow of spare parts to Egypt
needed by Cairo to keep its military machine effective. Yet
International Institute Cor Strategic Studies (IISS)
Strategic Survey 1972 (London, 1973), p. 26.

60
in October 1972 the Soviets abandoned that tact and
replacement parts for arms were once again supplied. Also, that
month the Soviets agreed to send Egypt some 60 SA-6 SAMS,
extremely mobile and accurate missiles that had never before
80been deployed outside of the Warsaw Pact countries. Probably
the immediate reason why Moscow began to resupply replacement
parts was because Sadat dismissed War Minister Sedek who was
known to have strong anti-Soviet feelings. His ouster was
followed by that of Admiral Rahman, Commander of the Egyptian
Navy, who was also an outspoken critic of the Soviets. Another
later factor affecting the decision for increased deliveries
of military hardware was the inclusion of Marshal Grechko , the
Defense Minister who had close personal ties with Brezhnev,
into the Politburo in April 1973. Marshal Crechko had long been
associated with Soviet-Egyptian policy and was known to favor




But probably Moscow's basic reason not only for renewed
arms shipments to Egypt but also for its likely last minute
approval of Egyptian-Syrian war plans for October 1973 was that,
short of direct intervention, it could not turn President Sadat
80
I1SS, Military Balance 1973-1974 (London, 1973), p. 82.
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For more on this subject see Malcolm Mackintosh, "The
Soviet Military: Influence on Foreign Policy," Probl ems of
Vol. XXII (Sept. -Oct. 1973), 1-12; and Jon KimcHe,




from his objective of war. With this decided, Soviet leaders
moved to protect their investment and policy goals in the
Middle East by providing support. From about April /May 1973
the Egyptians received Soviet arms on a fairly regular basis,
including the latest in bridging equipment, SAMs , tanks, and
anti-tank missiles. Relations were proper, if not friendly.
Moscow hoped ultimately to transform support into influence,
and to use this influence to advance broader, more long range,
interests.
IX
And so, in spite of temporary rapprochements since
late 1970, at the start of the October War Soviet-Egyptian
relations were not stable. Cairo saw Soviet intransigence as
the culprit: Moscow was the indecisive factor in an Arab bid
to regain prestige and territory. True, the Soviets were
supplying arms, but with the arms came the admonishment not to
upset the status quo by military action. As for the Kremlin,
it did not really trust Sadat to comply with its wishes, yet,
on balance, there was no sound reason to sever relations.
Quite the opposite. Although Egypt wasn't the leader it had
been in Nasser's heyday, it was still the predominant Arab
power and its opposition to Soviet policies in the Middle East
could well moan failure of those policies.
The October War
Since becoming President, Sadat had found himself in a
political stalemate vis a vis the Israelis that he was not
able to break. Egypt's economy was stagnant, the society was'




was busy just trying to keep his government viable. ' As
previously stated, he became convinced, with encouragement from
military leaders, that he had to do something to rekindle the
spirit of Egyptians and to force a new look at the Arab-
Israeli question. On October 6, 1973, Egyptian troops launched
an extremely successful attack on Israeli positions in the
Sinai while at the same time the Syrians went into battle on
the GoLan front.
There is no doubt that Moscow had advance notice of the
Q ->
coordinated Arab offensive against Israel. " The question is,
did the Kremlin approve? It would seem as though the answer is
yes, but a reluctant yes and with some misgiving. There was
much to Jose, not only would detente be jeopardized; relations
with friendly Arab states might suffer if their war demands
were not met, much sophisticated military material could be
lost, there was the real possibility of a superpower confron-
tation, and another loss by Arab armies could do much harm to
Soviet prestige around the world. The problem was that there
was really no way Egypt could be stopped, short of direct





For example, see P. J. Vatikiotis, "Egypt Adrift: A
Study in Disillusion," New Middle last, No. 54 (March, 1973),
pp. 5-11.
8 8
The Soviets evacuated suddenly, and en masse, most
indents and non-essential persons from Cairo and Damascus on
3 and 4 October. Also, see IISS, "The Midd East War,"
Strategic Survey 1973 (London, 19 74), pp. 27-28.
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The Soviet Union's response to the October War can best
be described as flexible. The Kremlin did not proclaim a
general line and stick to it, as one might say the
United States did by calling for an immediate separation of
antagonists together with cease-fire talks, but rather it
adjusted its policy line over time. This can be summed up as
follows
:
(1) Initially Moscow was opposed to a renewed war but
when it was apparent that Sadat and Syrian President Asad were
committed to action it gave grudging approval and even
accelerated arms supplies.
(2) Immediately after the war began, Soviet
Ambassador Vinogradov spoke to Sadat about the feasibility of a
cease-fire, indicating Moscow's concern about the consequences
of continued hostilities.
(3) On 9 October, sensing that the USSR could exploit
the Arab's initial military advantage, Brezhnev sent a letter
to President Boumedienne of Algeria suggesting that Algeria
support Egypt and Syria by all means available^ in effect
Brezhnev was encouraging a widening in the scope of the war.
New York Times, April 18, 1974, pp. 1, 19.





(4) The letter was followed on 10 October by the start
of an extensive arms airlift to Egypt and Syria (and to a
i i- L t \ 86lesser extent, Iraq).
(5) After talks in Moscow with Boumedienne on
14-1.5 October, the Soviet Union affirmed its "determination to
promote in every way the liberation of all Arab territories
O "7
occupied by Israel." ' This statement was decidedly different
from the first official Soviet government communique
(7 October) dealing with the war which simply maintained that
o o
the Soviet Union was a "reliable friend of the Arab states."
(6) With a shift in the situation on the battlefront,
so there was a swing in Soviet outlook. Premier Kosygin
arrived in Cairo on 16 October, and after two days probably
convinced Sadat to accept a cease-fire. This is presumed
because one day after Kosygin returned to the USSR Kissinger was
asked to come to Moscow and a cease-fire plan was then quickly
agreed to.
According to General Carlton, Commander of Military
I Lft Command, the USSR made a total of 930 flights
delivering 15,000 tons of war material to the Arabs. The
United States airlifted 22,400 tons to Israel. Armed Forces
Journal International







Pravda, October 8, 1973.
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These tactical shifts did not detract from the fact
that Moscow did indeed give full support, short of directly
89involving its own combat forces, to the Arab states.
Postwar Development s
The USSR was undoubtably hoping to markedly improve its
standing with Cairo as a result of the lifesaving support it
dered the Arab states during October. There was no doubt
that the Arab armed forces could not have sustained a war as
long as they did without massive Soviet military aid.
Admiral Moorer testified to Congress as Chairman of the JCS
that the cost of Soviet arms delivered to Egypt and Syria
Q
during the war amounted to about $2.6 billion. The Kremlin
was dismayed, if not angered, to see Sadat expand ties with the
United States almost immediately following the war. Diplomatic
relations with Washington were restored, business arrangements
ire consummated v/ith American firms, and Cairo encouraged an
influx of Western aid by guaranteeing that money invested in
Egypt would not be expropriated. One Russian commentator,
writing in I zvestia
,
bluntly warned Cairo that infusion of
American capital "may in time, as the experience of history
89The so-called superpower confrontation of
25-26 October can be viewed from the Soviet-Arab vantage point
as diplomatic and implied military support. The Soviet note
of 25 October to the Israeli government stating that the
continuation of Israeli aggression "will entail very serious
consequences," can be similarly viewed.
90
Wall Street Journal, February 27, 1974, p. 1
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teaches, turn into a bitter hangover for Egypt, and especially
91for its people."
But what disturbed Soviet leaders most was Sadat's
willingness to utilize Secretary of State Kissinger's "shuttle
diplomacy," that excluded participation by the Soviet Union,
to effect substantive decisions in Middle East affairs. When
Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail Fahmi hurriedly went to
Moscow following the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement
of January 18, 1974, to detail what had transpired, Moscow
emphasized the need for its inclusion into any further
deliberations. Pravda reported:
It was stressed [during Fahmi ' s talks with Soviet
leaders] that an important factor in the struggle for
a just settlement in the Near East is the close coor-
dination of the actions of the Soviet Union and Egypt
at all stages, including in the work of the Near East
peace conference and in all the work; roups that
could come out of it. 92
The Kremlin was not going to bo left out of any "peace
conferences" or "working groups" that would make policy
affecting its interests in the region. And yet, this was
precisely what was happening in early 1974. Cairo's
acceptance of Kissinger's diplomacy was in fact isolating
Moscow from the very region, and the very decision making
processes, that it needed to be involved in to protect and
advance its own strategems.
91
L. Tolkunov, "The Near East: Two Tendancies,"
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,
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With this in mind, Anclrey Gromyko , the Soviet Foreign
Minister and Politburo member, was dispatched to Cairo and
Damascus in March 1974 on an important and delicate mission:
to assess the attitudes of the Arab leaders, to discover where
the Soviet Union stood with respect to recent United States
diplomatic initiatives, and to offer Moscow's view of the
postwar situation. The mood of the Kremlin and how it
perceived its relations with Egypt can best be seen by examining
the Soviet press and noting the differences between Gromyko '
s
93Syrian visit and his Egyptian visit.
Pravda reported that the Soviet-Syrian talks were held
in a "warm, comradely atmosphere" but that the Soviet-Egyptian
meetings concentrated on problems between the two sides and took
place Ln a "businesslike atmosphere" --a euphemism indicating
severe disagreement. Furthermore, there were no complimentary
Soviet press reports devoted to Gromyko ' s talks with
Foreign Minister Fahmi , as there were for the Gromyko -Khaddam
(Syrian Foreign Minister) talks. I'n the final communique of
8 March devoted to the Soviet-Syrian meetings, it was noted
that: (1) the Soviets would strengthen Syria's defense
capability; (2) the Soviets recognized Syria's "inalienable
right to use all effective means to liberate its occupied
lands"; (3) Damascus recognized the vital importance of Soviet
support in all fields and emphasized the need for its
93Coverage oi; the Gromyko trip in Pravda, March 1, 6 and
, 1974; and Izvestia, ; March 8, 1974.
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continuation; and (4) a protocol on a comprehensive, long term
program for the development of the Syrian oil industry had
been signed. Significantly, there were no such pronouncements
in the joint communique describing the Soviet-Egyptian meetings,
only some relatively rnild pleasantries were exchanged.
Clearly the Soviets were signalling their sentiments,
and, between Egypt and Syria, their immediate policy
priorities. Although Soviet policy toward Syria is not the
subject of this study, it is necessary to note that Moscow now
seemed to reorient the thrust of its Middle East foreign
policy interests from Egypt to Syria (this was also true when
the Soviets left Egypt in July 1972; they endeavored to cement
closer ties with Syria to ensure themselves a voice in Arab
Irs). Mo doubt Sadat and his advisers understood well what
was happening; however, they made no attempt to reverse the
Soviet moves, quite the contrary. In April, just one month
after Gromyko had been in Cairo on his abortive mission of
"goodwill," the Kremlin stopped its arms shipments to Egypt.
It was probably no coincidence that it was then that Sadat
publicly announced that Egypt would end 18 years of reliance, on
Soviet arms because Moscow had used the supply of weapons as




The Kremlin was using its control over .the flow of
military aid as a means to persuade Cairo that the Soviet Union
94Mew York Times, April 19, 19 74, pp. 1, 5.
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must not, and could not, be isolated from Middle East affairs.
The use of military aid as a "persuader" was not new--this
Soviet tactic had last, been used against Egypt, as we s.
after Sadat's July 1972 expulsion order.
The Soviets halted the flow of arms to Egypt in
April 1974, concurrently, they sent Syria an enormous amount of
military aid- -totaling some $2 billion- -which by October of that
year included the swing-wing MIG-23 that Sadat had repeatedly
95
asked for but never received. ' One reason for Syria s favored
treatment was that the Kremlin hoped it could bring indirect
pressure to bear on Egypt (through Syria) to toe the Soviet
policy line. Also, because of increased Ln ' nee with
Damascus, Kremlin leaders were able to use Syria as a temporary
counterweight to Egypt, thus curbing a singular United States
diplomatic offensive in the region--and effectively slowing the
pace at which steps were being taken to provide for a further
Egyp t ian- 1 s rae 1 i s e 1 1 1 erne n t
.
Soviet-Egyptian relations remained severely strained
throughout 1974, and yet, both sides kept the door to reconcil-
iation purposely ajar: pleasant notes stressing mutual
friendship were exchanged in May on the third anniversary of
96the Treaty of Friendship, Podgorny stopped at Aswan in August
95Wall Street Journal , November 21, 1974, p. 1; and
sweek
, MovemBer "2'57~^.974, p. 45.
96Text of notes Ln F avda, May 31, 1974.
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on his way home from Somalia for "friendly" talks, and a Soviet
delegation (though low ranking) was present for opening
ceremonies of the Helwan Steel plant, itself built with Soviet
economic aid. In October Foreign Minister Fahmi went to Moscow,
the first visit by a high ranking Egyptian official in 1974, and
there were signs that a rapprochement was in the offing. 97 This
view was subsequently bolstered by the announcement that
Brezhnev would visit Cairo, but then suffered a setback when it
was learned in late December that the Communist Party leader's
trip had been cancelled. Instead, after some delay, it was
decided that Gromyko would visit Cairo in February 1975 to
continue Soviet-Egyptian meetings on a somewhat less
conspicuous level.
Underlying these diplomatic maneuvers, and what must be
recognized, was that at the close of 1974 Moscow and Cairo were
moving hesitantly toward renewing closer ties (and it appears
that as of this writing, March 1975, they will effect such
ties). There xvere sound reasons for this. From the Soviets'
viewpoint, they were faced with a familiar and recurring
problem: without Egyptian support their overall Middle East
policy was sorely handicapped. This was because Egyptian
successes in the October War greatly strengthened Sadat's
position within Egypt as well as his leadership position in the
Arab world. Cairo emerged from the conflict m expanded
97
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base of support- -good relations were established with Jordan,
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and most of the Persian Gulf shaykhdoms
.
In short, Egypt's ascendant position in Arab affairs
convinced Kremlin leaders (once again) that they must not
break with Cairo, rather, they must work toward reconciliation
and endeavor to re-establish some measurable influence with
the Egyptian regime.
From the Egyptian viewpoint, the primary reason for
moving toward rapprochement was, and still is, a continuing
need for Soviet weapons and spare parts. Even if Sadat was
serious about ending his dependence on Soviet weaponry, the
process of replacement and particularly retraining could
conceivably require several years- -given he could find the
sellers and the money. With no settlement of the Arab-Israeli
conflict and with tensions still high, Egypt's political-
military loaders would not allow the country's military
strength to decline. These leaders also recognized that Eg
I not- have achieved its regional prominence without
relatively strong armed forces; and that the readiness and
potency of their Soviet equipped armed forces had become a
function of Moscow's willingness to maintain a flow of spare
parts, sophisticated weapons, and technical expertise. It was
axiomatic that Egypt must be kept militarily strong.
Therefore, by the end of 1974 Egyptian leaders felt a very real
need for Soviet military aid. They reasoned that if a marked
Improvement .in relations with the Soviet Union was required to
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maintain military prowess, then Egypt must move in that
direction.
It was stated in the Introduction that oil had become
an inseparable aspect of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and
therefore it had assumed a unique role in Soviet-Egyptian, and
more broadly speaking, in Soviet-Middle East relations. Egypt
is a member of the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting
Countries (See Footnote 3 for member states) and while it is
not a major oil producer, as the dominant Arab power in the
region it is an important member. As such, it has a say in
OAPEC oil policies, especially as they relate to the
•Israeli question. Although the Soviets cannot now control
the pricing of Arab oil, the regulation of its flow, or the
determination of markets, some marked influence on these
factors would give the Soviets potent leverage in world
affairs. Obviously, influence with Cairo could well help
Moscow achieve such aspirations.
The Soviet Union did strongly encourage the Arab
States during, and following, the 1973 October War to use oil
as a politico-economic weapon to force concessions from the
West (and Japan) and to isolate Israel on the international
98
scene. Of course, Moscow stood to benefit from a selective
oil embargo policy-- though the Soviets always couched their
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for its "Arab friends." Moscow wanted to see NATO split and
rendered ineffective, a longstanding aim; it wanted ta heighten
the "contradictions" between the United States and the
Third World; and it wanted to "prove" the weakness of the
capitalist system. These aims were meant to be furthered
through careful manipulation of the oil weapon. How much
influence Moscow actually had in Egypt with respect to oil
policies remains unknown; however, considering the amount of
arms being delivered during the October War, Soviet
suggestions were at least seriously considered, if not
actually implemented.
Another aspect of Soviet interest in Middle East oil
is a growing need for that commodity throughout Russia which
cannot readily be met by domestic production. The Petroleum
Pres s Service has indicated a probable 1980 Soviet oil deficit
99
on the order of 100 million tons per year, and the
Economist has estimated the shortfall of that year to range
from 50 to 100 million tons. The Soviets could make up
this difference from their own resources, but the exploitation
of Siberian oil is exceedingly costly because of climatic
conditions and topograph. Leal hindrances. Cost per barrel of
Siberian oil is estimated to be three to four times the cost
of a like amount of Middle East oil (at 1974 prices). If
99The Pretroleum Press Service, January 1973, p. 5.
I(;!
Economist, July 10, 1971, p. 90.
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Moscow had substantial political influence in Arab states, it
would probably encourage nationalization of oil companies, as
it did with the Iraq Petroleum Company in 1972, and diversion
of oil from Western markets to Lhe USSR and its satellites.

VI. CONCLUSION
Soviet policy in Egypt, and generally in the Middle
East, stems from a combination of a fluid communist ideology
and a conscious attitude of Realpolltik within the Kremlin.
The Soviet Union does not desire additional real estate in the
region, rather it strives to obtain political and psychological
influence so as to advance its national and international
policies. As it was
,
pragmatic raisons d'etat transcended
ideological considerations in the 1950s. Moscow capitalized on
two events to penetrate the Middle East and move toward a
position of paramountcy in Egyptian affairs: the formation of
the Baghdad Pact (1955) and the Arab-Israeli conflict. The
Soviet leaders entered into a friendly state-- to-state rela-
tionship with Cairo without attempting to subvert the masses
through an indigenous communist party. Then, as today,
communism and the class struggle were relegated to a position
of secondary importance. As one Soviet commentator wrote:
It would be the worst example of blind dogmatism and
the greatest strategic error in the struggle for the
socialist transformation of the world to reject the
revolutionary democrats because their views are at
var ianc e wi th Marx i sm . -L L
Cdeology, while subordinate to power dictates,
nevertheless enters into Soviet considerations and cannot be
i I
R. Andreesyan, "Revo Lationary Democrats of Asia and
Africa," Azrya i 3 sezodnya, No. 10 (1966).
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ignored. After all, the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
governs and controls the USSR--and within the CPSU are the
country's leaders whose claims to authority are founded, and
legitimized, by Marxist-Leninist doctrine. And so, everytime
an Arab country becomes "progressive," everytime trade
agreements and cultural pacts are consummated between the
Soviet Union and Middle East countries, and everytime there is
an exchange of dignitaries ending with a communique expressing
"friendly solidarity," Soviet leaders vindicate their system
to themselves and their critics. Accused of apostasy by
Communist China, the Kremlin can refer with some pride and
sense of accomplishment to its gains in the Middle East.
The impact of Soviet nonmilitary trade and aid on
Egyptian policies, while sometimes over-rated, is of
consequence. It is estimated that some one million Egyptians
would be out of work if the Soviets cancelled existing trade
agreements with Cairo. Moscow extends loans with low
interest rates, usually two or two and one-half percent, and
accepts Egyptian goods for payment, although now that oil rich
Arab countries are backing Sadat, Moscow is showing a
preference for hard currency. The volume of trade between the
two grew steadily from 1955 to 1974, and during those years




>unt importance to the Soviet-
ptian linkage is their military marriage. Once Moscow was
established as the. sole arms distributor of Egypt, it was
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relatively easy to introduce a degree of dependence into the
relationship. The requirement for arms remains today Moscow's
principal tool for influence in Egypt. It is necessary for one
to keep in mind that the existence of a strong military has
been, since Nasser's day, a sine qua non among Cairo's
political-military leaders. Nothing could be allowed to cripple
the strength of the armed forces as they, above all else, were
the power base for Egypt's rulers and enabled the country to be
a leader in the Arab world.
Of all the military aid the Soviet Union extended to
Third World countries from 195 5 to 1973, Egypt, the largest
102
single recipient by far, received a full 40 percent, For
the same time period, the next single country on the list was
India, receiving some 15 percent. Military aid to Cairo In
1973 amounted to some $500 million and while there was a
drastic cutback in L974, because of Moscow's displeasure with
Cairo's independent postwar policies, the Kremlin has
maintained a willingness to renew large-scale arms sales and
shipments. Indeed, following Foreign Minister Gromyko '
s
i 02Gur Ofer, "The Economic Burden of the Soviet
Involvement in the Middle East,'' Soviet Studies XXIV, No. 3
(Jan. 1973), p. 329; and U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency (ACDA) , World Military Expenditures and Arms Trade
3-1973 (State "Department, Washington, D.C., 1 (J74)
,
pp. 31, 70, 89.
103
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amount of military aid received by Egypt in 1973 closer to
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fence mending mission to Cairo in February 1975, the Soviets
resumed shipment of advanced weapons to Egypt by delivering
six MIG 23 fighters, the aircraft that Sadat had long sought.
There is no doubt but that the Soviets have a
substantial quantitative military and economic investment, and
an implicit political stake, in Egypt. Soviet policy aims
aside, this amounts to a sizable investment in prestige.
A defeat of Egyptian forces in battle, a reversal by Cairo of
its socialistic programs, or an official denouncement of
Soviet-Egyptian friendship would constitute a psychological
blow to the Kremlin as well as a very real setback to Soviet
foreign policy objectives. The Russians would like to
maintain a formidable Egypt that owes enough allegiance to
them to ensure obligation of Cairo's support in their inter-
national dealings. This would include siding with them in
their ideological dispute with China, providing support for
Soviet declarations in international forums, helping to
eliminate the Western presence in the Middle East, and use of
Egypt as a base for extended military and political operations.
The Arab-Israeli conflict affords the Soviets a
built-in mechanism which they can use to enhance their
position Ln Egypt while endeavoring to establish a more
communistically oriented Aral) Socialist Union and government.
For now, Moscow needs the constant tension that the Arab-
Israeli strife produces to protect its investment in Egypt,
although it would like to be able to control this tension. If
Arabs and Jews could settle the conflict to the sal : Lon
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of both parties, there are strong indications that Egypt would
not align itself with the USSR. Events such as Egypt's
response to the attempted communist led coup in the Sudan in
July 1971, the July 1972 Soviet expulsion from Egypt, and
Cairo's post October War policies (i.e. antagonistic toward
Moscow) all sustain that observation.
Also, because Islam is a potent counterforce to
communism and religious beliefs are a part of the cultural
tradition rooted in Arab life, the Soviets will most probably
have to settle for a rather formal, government-to-government
type relationship with Egypt (and other Arab countries). While
this has not curtailed Soviet aims in the area- -Moscow has not
demanded ideological conformity- -it has proved to be a major
stumbling block in Arab-Soviet relations which the Kremlin will
find difficult, if not impossible, to circumvent.
Soviet investment in Egypt has paid dividends:
Egyptian and Arab support in international forums, the use of
Egypt as a strategic transit point to India and Africa, and
endorsement of Soviet legitimacy in the Middle East are benefits
ady obtained. In addition, the Soviets continue to try to
benefit from and influence Arab oil policies; the backing of
Egypt in this cause would prove most helpful. In the near
future the Soviet Navy will make use of Egyptian ports and an
opened Suez Canal to project a significant military presence in




In sum, one must expect the Soviet Union to continue
its support of Egypt so as to establish some measure of
genuine long term influence with Cairo. If successful, the
Kremlin can advance not only its policies in the Middle East,
but also its global interests. The Soviets will not readily
relinquish their position in Egypt and the Arab world. From
their vantage point, the manifold and important political,
economic, and strategic benefits to be gained in the region are
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